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1 Introduction
Empirical tax reform analysis for European countries almost without exception
reports on the very high welfare costs involved in marginally raising total tax
revenue through an increase in the VAT or excise rate on alcoholic beverages and
tobacco.1 The coexistence of such a high marginal welfare cost with much lower
values for other commodities and services seemingly points at the possibility of
significant welfare increases by reducing of taxes on alcohol and tobacco, and
raising those on, say, transport. Still, authors of such studies hasten to remark
that their analysis does not take into account the demerit good arguments that
probably motivated these high excise tax levels in the first place.
Although the (de)merit good argument dates back to Musgrave (1959), its
introduction in the optimal taxation literature did not come before Besley’s (1988)
analysis.2 The reason for this delay is that standard second-best analysis of
economic policy takes place in a welfaristic framework, while (de)merit good
arguments drive a wedge between the evaluations of citizens and those of policy
makers.
The strength of Besley’s (1988) model is twofold. First, it incorporates merit
good arguments in an otherwise very standard welfaristic setting, and therefore
allows to demonstrate clearly how putting one foot into non-welfaristic terrain
aﬀects the familiar first- and second-best policy rules. Second, Besley relates the
(de)merit good considerations to where we would expect them to have their root:
the consumption pattern of the individual agent, rather than the aggregate level
of consumption of particular commodities.3
Unfortunately, Besley’s first-best analysis suﬀers from a deficiency that puts
the framework into question. As I will show below, his model in fact prescribes
to subsidise demerit goods and to tax merit goods whenever the demand for
those goods is inelastic. Keeping in mind the fact that habit formation is often
responsible for an inelastic demand for cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, one
is then led to the paradox that such demand should be encouraged rather than
discouraged.
Although a normative model cannot be subjected to the same kind of falsifi-
cation tests as positive models, if its policy prescriptions go exactly against one’s
gut-feeling, then one should ask whether the framework within which those pre-
scriptions were derived is an appropriate one. I think one can question Besley’s
1Decoster & Schokkaert (1989) for Belgium, Madden (1995) for Ireland, Kaplanoglou &
Newbery (2002) for Greece, Schroyen & Aasness (2002) for Norway.
2Several years earlier, Sandmo (1983) outlined for diﬀerent degrees of market completeness
the policy implications of a divergence between the agent’s beliefs about the future states of
the world, and those of the social planner. Besley’s (1988) model, and the present one, concern
the case of (de)merit wants: the divergence between the agent’s preferences and those of the
social planner.
3See e.g. Pazner (1972).
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framework, but at the same time that it can be easily remedied in a way that
preserves its twofold strength.
To show my arguments in the sharpest way, I start by explaining them in a
first best setting. This, I do in the next two sections. In section 4, I oﬀer an
alternative way of modeling (de)merit good arguments and derive the ensuing
first best policy rules. Second-best rules are presented in section 5, and in
section 6, I derive the marginal cost expressions for tax reform analysis. Section
7 concludes.
2 Consumer behaviour and government opinion
Consider a representative consumer whose preferences over the numéraire com-
modity (z ∈ R+), a (de)merit good (y ∈ R+), and a standard commodity
(x ∈ R+) can be represented by the monotonic and strongly quasi-concave utility
function u(z, x, y). Let the consumer prices for these commodities be given by
(1, qx, qy) and the consumer’s exogenous disposable income equal tom−T , where
T is the lump sum tax and m is pre-tax income.
This consumer then solves the problem
max
z,x,y
u(z, x, y) (1)
s.t. z + qxx+ qyy = m− T.
The first order conditions are4
u2
u1
= qx,
u3
u1
= qy, (2)
and, together with the budget constraint, these are satisfied by the optimal com-
modity demands
z(qx, qy,m− T ), x(qx, qy,m− T ), and y(qx, qy,m− T ). (3)
The government evaluates the allocation of resources according to the modi-
fied utility function
ug(z, x, y). (4)
It takes individual behaviour (3) as given and is concerned with solving:
max
tx,ty,T
ug(z(qx, qy,m− T ), x(qx, qy,m− T ), y(qx, qy,m− T )) (5)
s.t. txx(qx, qy,m− T ) + tyy(qx, qy,m− T ) + T ≥ R (λ)
where qx = px + tx and qy = py + ty.
4Subscript i with a function denotes a partial derivates w.r.t. the ith argument.
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The first order conditions are shown in the appendix to provide us with the
following tax rules:
tx =
u2
u1
(z, x, y)− u
g
2
ug1
(z, x, y) (6a)
ty =
u3
u1
(z, x, y)− u
g
3
ug1
(z, x, y) (6b)
who have the intuitive interpretation of driving a wedge between the consumer’s
marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for each good, and that of the government.
3 Besley’s scaling approach
Besley (1988) proposes the following specification for the government’s evaluation
function:
ug(z, x, y) = u(z, x, θy). (7)
and defines the third commodity as a merit (demerit) good whenever θ > (<)1.
This scaling approach dates back to Fisher & Shell (1967) who used it to construct
an index for the true cost of living when people’s tastes change or when products
change in quality. In the present context, the government converts the quantity
of the (de)merit good into eﬃciency units, but otherwise fully respects individual
preferences.
With this specification, the earlier derived tax rules become5
tx =
u2
u1
(z, x, y)− u2
u1
(z, x, θy), (8a)
ty =
u3
u1
(z, x, y)− θu3
u1
(z, x, θy). (8b)
To see what these rules imply, consider the preference ordering represented
by the CES utility function u(z, x, y) = (α1zρ + α2xρ + α3yρ)
1/ρ, with αi > 0
(i = 1, 2, 3), and −∞ < ρ < 1. With such preferences, u3
u1
= α3α1
¡
y
z
¢ρ−1
, u
g
3
ug1
=
α3
α1
θ
¡θy
z
¢ρ−1
and u2
u1
=
ug2
ug1
= α2α
¡
x
z
¢ρ−1
. No tax should be levied on the standard
commodity, while for the (de)merit good, we have
ty
qy
=
(1− θρ)
θ
. (9)
Whenever the elasticity of substitution is below one (−∞ < ρ < 0), we get the
paradoxical result that a merit good should be taxed while a demerit good should
be subsidised!
5In deriving the first best rule for the tax on the (de)merit good (8b), Besley (1988) made
a mistake. The correct rule was provided in a comment by Feehan (1990).
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What is going on? Why does a seemingly natural way of modelling (de)merit
good arguments lead to results whose intuitive appeal depends on the elasticity
of substitution? Let us consider the limiting case of Leontief preferences, and
ignore—for the sake of graphical representation—the standard non-numéraire good.
Suppose that a person’s preferences can be represented bymin{z, y}. This person
has L-shaped indiﬀerence curves with the corners lying on the 45o line, as shown
in figure 1.
 
z=y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         z=½y 
y 
z 
Leontief preferences and a demerit good
The government, on the other hand, thinks of good y as a demerit good and
subscribes to the preference ordering represented by min{z, 1
2
y}. The associated
indiﬀerence curves are the dashed lines. Clearly, the government’s preferences
are more favourable to commodity y than the agent’s preferences are!
With Leontief preferences, no finite subsidy will be able to distort the agent’s
budget allocation away from the laissez-faire solution, but once the degree of sub-
stitutability becomes positive, it will. The reason why discounting a commodity
leads to subsidisation should now be clear. The government respects that red
wine is complementary to a pasta meal. But it regards one bottle of wine only
half as good as you do. In order to get the maximal utility out of a pasta dish,
it wants you to drink more wine, not less.
This paradox holds true more generally. Notice that the government’s MWP
for the (de)merit good (θ u3
u1
(z, x, θy)) has the following elasticity w.r.t. θ:
∂ log(u
g
3
ug1
)
∂ log θ
= 1−
Ã
−
∂ log uy
uz
(z, x, θy)
∂ log(θy)
!
. (10)
Thus, whether the government’s MWP exceeds or falls short of that of the con-
sumer depends on whether the (own) demand price elasticity for the (de)merit
good exceeds or falls short of 1 in absolute value. If the demand for tobacco, say,
is inelastic, the demand price elasticity is likely to be large, and under the scaling
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approach the government’s MWP for tobacco will exceed that of the smoking
agent.6
4 An alternative way of modeling merit good
arguments
The previous analysis indicates the need for an approach that ties down in a
more robust way the relationship between the government’s MWP and that of the
consumer. I propose to model this relationship by means of the total willingness-
to-pay (TWP) function in terms of the numéraire commodity:
F (x, y, u). (11)
This function gives the amount of the numéraire required to bring the con-
sumer at the utility level u when consuming x and y units of the other two
commodities; its graph is the indiﬀerence surface. The marginal willingness to
pay (MWP) for the (de)merit good is then
−∂F (x, y, u)
y
= −F2(x, y, u). (12)
If the government is of the opinion that consumers appreciate the (de)merit
good too (much) little, then a natural way of proceeding is to attribute to the
government the MWP function
−F g2 (x, y, u) = −F2(x, y, u) + µ(y), (13)
where µ(y) is (negative) positive for a (de)merit good.7 Notice that (13) does
not directly impose any single crossing in the commodity space because it is
conditional on the utility level u: the amount of z the consumer believes is
necessary to reach that utility level need not be the same as the amount the
government believes is required. Indeed, integrating this MWP function to a
TWP function gives
F g(x, y, u) = F (x, y, u)−
Z y
yg
µ(χ)dχ, (14)
where yg can be thought of as the level of consumption above which the govern-
ment’s marginal evaluation starts to deviate from the consumer’s.
6With additive preferences quasi-linear in the numéraire, the (own) elasticity of the inverse
demand schedule is exactly the reciprocal of the (own) Marshallian price elasticity.
7More complicated modifications of the MWP function are possible, but one should make
sure that for a corresponding TWP function to exist, the cross partial derivatives should be
symmetric: F g21 = F
g
12 (Frobenius theorem).
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The interpretation of (14) is as follows. Suppose the agent has (x, y) avail-
able. Then in order to reach a utility level u, she believes F (x, y, u) units of the
numéraire are required, while the government, convinced of the merit properties of
the third commodity, believes F g(x, y, u) units are suﬃcient. What (13) then tells
is that the slope of the government’s indiﬀerence curve through (F g(x, y, u), x, y)
diﬀers from the slope of the consumer’s indiﬀerence curve through (F (x, y, u), x, y)
with a factor µ(y).
To this TWP function corresponds a utility function ug(·), defined as
ug (F g(x, y, ν), x, y, ν) ≡ ν (all ν). (15)
It is easy to show that
ug (z, x, y) = u
Ã
z +
Z y
yg
µ(χ)dχ, x, y
!
. (16)
(see appendix). A suﬃcient condition for ug(·) to be strongly quasi-concave is
that µ0(·) ≤ 0.
The two MRS expressions necessary to compute the optimal tax rates are
therefore
ug2
ug1
(z, x, y) =
u2
u1
(z +
Z y
yg
µ(χ)dχ, x, y) (17a)
ug3
ug1
(z, x, y) =
u3
u1
(z +
Z y
yg
µ(χ)dχ, x, y) + µ(y). (17b)
Again, the reason (17b) is not exactly µ(y) is that the evaluation here is at the
same bundle, not at the same utility level as in (13). A suﬃcient condition for
single crossing of indiﬀerence curves (in the sense that sign(MRSgyz−MRSyz) =
sign(µ(y))) is that the (de)merit good is a normal good (in the sense that ∂∂z (
u3
u1
) >
0).
Inserting (17) in (6) and using a Taylor expansion of ui
u1
(z +
R y
y
µ(χ)dχ, x, y)
around ui
u1
(z, x, y) gives
tx ' −
µ
∂ u2
u1
(z, x, y)
∂z
¶Z y
yg
µ(χ)dχ (18a)
ty ' −
µ
∂ u3
u1
(z, x, y)
∂z
¶Z y
yg
µ(χ)dχ− µ(y) (18b)
The round bracket terms on the rhs denotes the uncompensated eﬀect of
a marginal increase in z on the demand price for each of the non-numéraire
commodities . The signs of these eﬀects are related to the normality of these
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commodities (although with 3 or more commodities, the income eﬀects are more
involved).
To fix ideas, suppose that the government considers y as a merit good, µ(χ) >
0, ∀χ ≥ 0, and that both x and y are normal goods. Then both non-numéraire
commodities should be subsidised. First, the merit good should be subsidised
with a rate at which the government’s MWP exceeds that of the consumer (µ).
But in addition, both non-numéraire goods should be subsidised for the diﬀerence
in willingness to pay for all inframarginal units. The intuition is as follows.
The government is convinced that the consumer is better oﬀ than she herself
believes she is (because she ignores the merit properties of the third good). To
the extent that the non-numéraire commodities are normal goods, it considers
both commodities as underconsumed (relative to the numéraire) and wants to
stimulate their consumption by subsidisation.
5 Second-best rules
Suppose now that there are many consumers, indexed by h, with not necessarily
the same preferences or income level, and that the government cannot diﬀerentiate
commodity taxes across consumers. Let social preferences be given by
W =
X
h
λhugh
¡
zh, xh, yh
¢
=
X
h
λhuh
Ã
zh +
Z yh
yg
µ(χ)dχ, xh, yh
!
. (19)
To focus on the eﬃciency arguments, I assume that diﬀerentiated lump sum taxes
are available. The government’s problem is then8
max
tx,ty,{Th}
X
h
λhugh
¡
zh(qx, qy,m
h − T h), xh(qx, qy,mh − T h), yh(qx, qy,mh − T h)
¢
(20)
s.t.
X
h
txx
h(qx, qy,m
h − T h) +
X
h
tyy
h(qx, qy,m
h − T h) +
X
h
T h ≥ R (γ)
Defining βh def= λ
hugh1
γ and proceeding in the same way as in the first best case,
we get: X
h
βh
µ∂bxh
∂qx
∂bxh
∂qy
∂byh
∂qx
∂byh
∂qy
¶µ
thx
thy
¶
=
µP
h
∂bxh
∂qx
P
h
∂bxh
∂qyP
h
∂byh
∂qx
P
h
∂byh
∂qy
¶µ
tx
ty
¶
(21)
where a ^denotes a compensated price eﬀect and thx
def
=
uh2
uh1
− u
gh
2
ugh1
and thy
def
=
uh3
uh1
− u
gh
3
ugh1
8I agree with Capéau and Ooghe (2003) that the reaction functions entering the social
welfare function should be those of the real agents, and not, as Besley (1988) proceeded, those
of phantom agents that are endowed with the ’right’ preferences.
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are the tax rates that person h would face under first best.9 By premultiplying
(21) through by the inverse of the aggregate Slutsky matrix, we could isolate
the vector of second best tax rates
¡
tx
ty
¢
, but it is only under Hicksian indepen-
dence between the two non-numéraire commodities (∂bxh∂qy = 0) that this becomes
illuminating:
ty =
X
h
βh
yh
ya
bεhyybεayy thy (22)
with bεhyy def= ∂byh∂qy qyyh , ya def= Ph yh and bεayy def= Ph ∂byh∂qy qyya . Expression (22) reflects
the second best nature of the policy. As the government cannot individualise
commodity tax rates, it chooses a uniform tax rate on the (de)merit commodity
which is a weighted average of the individual first best rates, where the weight
depend on the social marginal utility of income (βh), the share in aggregate
consumption (y
h
ya
) and the sensitivity of individual relative to aggregate demand
(bεhyybεayy ). A similar expression is true for tx.
Under first best, the social marginal utilities of income, βh, should all be equal
to unity. Under uniform commodity taxation, this is no longer necessarily the
case. The first order condition for the lump sum tax on consumer h can now be
written as:
βh
µ
thx
∂xh
∂mh
+ thy
∂yh
∂mh
− 1
¶
=
µ
tx
∂xh
∂mh
+ ty
∂yh
∂mh
− 1
¶
(23)
showing that even at an optimal income distribution the social marginal utilities
of income will deviate from one to the extent that (i) the individual first best tax
rates diﬀer form the uniform ones, and (ii) the income eﬀects are diﬀerent from
zero. The latter case occurs with quasi linear preferences in the numéraire. I
will now give an example where all individual first best tax rates are identical
and used to implement the optimal allocation.
Suppose preferences are quasi-homothetic, meaning that for each agent there
are some ’survival’ quantities zh, xh, and yh such that
uh(z, x, y) = F h[vh(z − zh, x− xh, y − yh)]
with F h0(·) > 0 and vh(·) homogenous of degree 1 in (z− zh, x−xh, y− yh). We
then have the following
Lemma 1 Suppose that consumers have (i) quasi homothetic preferences that
are (ii) identical, with (iii) both ∂x
h
∂mh and
∂yh
∂mh positive. Suppose that (iv) µ(·) is
constant and (v) yg = yh. Then the vectors of individual first best tax rates are
identical and the first best allocation can be implemented by this common vector
and a set of lump sum taxes that set all βh equal to unity.
9More correctly would be to say that they characterise the first best tax rates, as the
diﬀerences in MRS are all evaluated at the second best solution.
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The proof, of which the details are spelled out in the appendix, goes roughly as
follows. (i) means that theMWPs are homogenous of degree zero in its arguments.
(ii), (iv) and (v) then imply that the individual (first best) tax rates are identical
across consumers. With (i), all substitution eﬀects are proportional in income,
which makes the (common) vector of first best tax rates proportional to the vector
the government uses, the factor of proportionality being ”the average β plus the
covariance of the βs with supernumerary incomes”. But with (i), income eﬀects
are independent of income and by (iii) and (23) βh = 1 (all h), which means the
factor of proportionality is 1 as well.
Implementation of the first best allocation is thus not incompatible with an
unequal income distribution. But the combination of assumptions for this to
happen is quite stringent and in general second best tax rates will be a genuine
weighted average of the first best ones.
6 Tax reform analysis
The tax rules derived in the previous sections characterise the optimal solution
under first and second best. For a policy maker, these rules may not be of
primary interest (i) because income distribution policy is not necessarily on the
same agenda as commodity tax policy, and (ii) because the existing commodity
tax structure puts a straightjacket on what can be achieved trough a reform.
More interesting are then the rules that indicate in which direction marginal tax
changes should occur, and that can easily be expressed in terms of accounting
and statistical data.
For this purpose, one is interested in the marginal cost in terms of social
welfare,W , of raising government revenue, R, with one Euro by changing the tax
on commodities x and y:
MCx = −
∂W/∂tx
∂R/∂tx
, MCy = −
∂W/∂ty
∂R/∂ty
. (24)
Expressions of this kind have been discussed in detail by Ahmad & Stern
(1984), who show that a neat parameterisation is obtained by multiplying nom-
inator and denominator by the respective after tax prices. Since the (de)merit
good arguments only aﬀect the nominators, I limit myself to this part of the
MC-expressions. Let me for simplicity assume that µ(y) ≡ µ and yg = 0.
For commodity x, we then have that
−∂W
∂tx
= −
X
h
λheuh1 ½∂zh∂qx + euh2euh1 ∂x
h
∂qx
+
·euh3euh1 + µ
¸
∂yh
∂qx
¾
, (25)
where a ~ above a marginal utility denotes that it is evaluated at the bun-
dle (zh + µyh, xh, yh). Using the first order Taylor approximation euhieuh1 ' qi +
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∂
∂z
uhi
uh1
(z, x, y) yhµ (i = 2, 3) and the adding up condition ∂z
h
∂qx
+qx
∂xh
∂qx
+qy
∂yh
∂qx
= −xh,
this expression can be rewritten as
−∂W
∂tx
'
X
h
λheugh1 ½xh − ∂xh∂qx ∂
u2
u1
(z, x, y)
∂z
yhµ− ∂y
h
∂qx
·
µ+
∂ u2
u1
(z, x, y)
∂z
yhµ
¸¾
.
(26)
Multiplying through by qx, and turning derivatives into elasticities, we finally
get
−qx
∂W
∂tx
'
X
h
λheugh1 ½qxxh − µyhµεhxxδhxz qxxhzh + εhyx
·
1 + δhyz
qyy
h
zh
¸¶¾
, (27)
where the Marshallian price elasticities and the demand price elasticities are
defined as
εhxx =
∂xh
∂qx
qx
xh
, εhyx =
∂yh
∂qx
qx
yh
, δhxz =
∂ u2
u1
∂z
z
u2
u1
, δhyz =
∂ u3
u1
∂z
z
u3
u1
. (28)
Similar operations lead to an analogue expression for −qy ∂W∂ty :
−qy
∂W
∂ty
'
X
h
λheugh1 ½qyyh − µyhµεhxyδhxz qxxhzh + εhyy
·
1 + δhyz
qyy
h
zh
¸¶¾
, (29)
with similar definitions for εhxy and ε
h
yy. Notice how the existence of a (de)merit
good argument corrects both MC expressions in a similar way.
Writing µyh = ηqyyh, the curly bracket terms can in principle be calculated
using expenditure data (expenditures on x and on y, and expenditures on x and
y relative to z) and uncompensated price and quantity elasticities. If these elas-
ticities are not available at the household (or income decile) level, they can as
an approximation be replaced by the aggregate elasticities. One can then pro-
duce diﬀerent rankings of the marginal costs, for diﬀerent values of the (de)merit
parameter η.
7 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this paper, I have questioned the scaling approach proposed by Besley (1988)
to model merit good arguments on the ground that it often leads to counterin-
tuitive policy prescriptions. I have proposed a diﬀerent approach which directly
interferes with the marginal willingness to pay for a (de)merit good.
Which approach to choose? If one is convinced that a (de)merit good argu-
ment should at least in a first best world precribe the subsidisation (taxation)
of that good, then the approach presented here meets this criterion better than
10
the scaling approach: only when the merit good is a very inferior one will the
policy rule (18b) prescribe taxation; the scaling approach would do so whenever
the good is price inelastic.
But even if the present approach prescribes taxation, then a rationale can be
provided: insofar the merit good considerations also apply to the inframarginal
units consumed, the government believes the agent is richer than she thinks she
is. Respecting the strong inferiority of the good, it wants the agent to consume
less of it.
The analysis has been performed for three commodities. However, its gener-
alisation to n commodities should be straightforward.
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Appendix
• Derivation of the first best tax rules.
The first order conditions for an interior maximum are given by:
∂L
∂tx
= ug1
½
∂z
∂qx
+
ug2
ug1
∂x
∂qx
+
ug3
ug1
∂y
∂qx
¾
+ γ
½
x+ tx
∂x
∂qx
+ ty
∂y
∂qx
¾
= 0 (30a)
∂L
∂ty
= ug1
½
∂z
∂qy
+
ug2
ug1
∂x
∂qy
+
ug3
ug1
∂y
∂qy
¾
+ γ
½
y + tx
∂x
∂qy
+ ty
∂y
∂qy
¾
= 0 (30b)
∂L
∂T
= −ug1
½
∂z
∂m
+
ug2
ug1
∂x
∂m
+
ug3
ug1
∂y
∂m
¾
− γ
½
1 + tx
∂x
∂m
+ ty
∂y
∂m
¾
= 0(30c)
Performing ∂L∂tx −
∂L
∂T x and
∂L
∂ty
− ∂L∂T y gives:½
∂bz
∂qx
+
ug2
ug1
∂bx
∂qx
+
ug3
ug1
∂by
∂qx
¾
+ eγ½tx ∂bx∂qx + ty ∂by∂qx
¾
= 0 (31a)½
∂bz
∂qy
+
ug2
ug1
∂bx
∂qy
+
ug3
ug1
∂by
∂qy
¾
+ eγ½tx ∂bx∂qy + ty ∂by∂qy
¾
= 0 (31b)
where abdenotes a compensated price eﬀect and eγ def= γ
ug1
. Using the homogeneity
condition on the compensated price eﬀects, (31) may be rewritten as
h
1
ug2
ug1
ug3
ug1
i

−qx −qy
1 0
0 1


"
∂bx
∂qx
∂bx
∂qy
∂by
∂qx
∂by
∂qy
#
= eγ £ tx ty ¤ " ∂bx∂qx ∂bx∂qy∂by
∂qx
∂by
∂qy
#
. (32)
Because the substitution matrix
¡ ∂bx
∂qx
∂bx
∂qy
∂by
∂qx
∂by
∂qy
¢
is negative definite, (32) reduces to
eγtx = qx − ug2
ug1
, and eγty = qy − ug3
ug1
. (33a)
Inserting these conditions back in the FOC for T , shows that eγ = 1.
Since qx = u2u1 and qy =
u3
u1
, the first best tax rates are as in the text.
• Derivation of ug(z, x, y)
By definition of F (·)
z +
Z y
yg
µ(χ)dχ = F
"
x, y, u
Ã
z +
Z y
yg
µ(χ)dχ, x, y
!#
(34)
m
z = F
"
x, y, u
Ã
z +
Z y
yg
µ(χ)dχ, x, y
!#
−
Z y
yg
µ(χ)dχ (35)
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By definition of F g(·), F g[x, y, ug(z, x, y)] = z, which means the above expression
can be written as
F g[x, y, ug(z, x, y)] = F
"
x, y, u
Ã
z +
Z y
yg
µ(χ)dχ, x, y
!#
−
Z y
yg
µ(χ)dχ (36)
From (14)
F g[x, y, ug(z, x, y)] = F g
"
x, y, u
Ã
z +
Z y
yg
µ(χ)dχ, x, y
!#
(37)
Therefore
ug (z, x, y) = u
Ã
z +
Z y
yg
µ(χ)dχ, x, y
!
. (38)
• Proof of lemma 1.
Expression
³
uh2
uh1
´g
can be written as
vh2
vh1
(zh − zh +
Z yh
yg
µ(χ)dχ, xh − xh, yh − yh). (39)
(
³
uh2
uh1
´g
looks similar but has the extra term µ(yh)).
For these preferences, it can be shown that the Marshallian demands for
commodity x is of the form
xh(q,mh) = xh +
∂bh(q)
∂qx
− xh
b(q)−mh(p)[m
h −mh(p)]. (40)
where b(q) is minimal expenditure necessary to generate one unit of utility and
mh(p)
def
= zh + qxx
h + qyy
h denotes survival income. Similar expressions hold for
the other two commodities.
Under the lemma’s assumptions, expression (39) reduces for every agent h to
vi
v1
(
∂b(q)
∂qz
− x+ µ[∂b(q)
∂qy
− y], ∂b(q)
∂qx
− x, ∂b(q)
∂qy
− y), (41)
since the expression is homogenous of degree 0 in its arguments and the term
mh−m(p)
b(q)−m(p) thus drops out. Every agent will then have the same vector of (first best)
13
tax rates, tc, say. Since all substitution eﬀects are proportional to supernumerary
income, (21) reduces to P
h β
h(mh −m(p))P
h(m
h −m(p)) t
c = t, or (42)
[βav + cov(βh,
mh −m(p)
mav −m(p)))]t
c = t (43)
On the other hand, because the income eﬀects are independent of income,
(23) can be written as βhr(tc) = r(t), where r(·) denotes the net increase in gov-
ernment revenue from a marginal increase in the lump sum grant to a consumer.
Combining both results gives:
r(t)
r(tc)
tc = t (44)
If then r(t) > (<) r(tc) then tc À (¿) t. Because both income eﬀects are
positive, this implies that r(tc) > (<) r(t), a contradiction. Therefore tc = t and
βh = 1 (all h).
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